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Introduction 
As entrepreneurs scramble to compete in a global business, profit maximization is just a 
minimum requirement which can not satisfy all stakeholders’ demands any more. A firm must 
sustain social pressure characterized by ever-increasing environmental accountability. This 
accountability includes heightened public concerns of both the firm’s performance and its 
environmental disclosure. This study provides and integrated analysis of how a firm’s 
performance and stakeholders’ influence might affect the level of environmental disclosure on 
corporate website. Understanding these interrelations is of increasing interest to both internal 
and external stakeholders in an era in which corporate environmental costs have become a 
significant business expense.   
We also can notice that the explosive growth of the internet provides firms the opportunity 
to disseminate information to a wide audience of shareholders, potential investors, and other 
institutions more economically, quickly in an undiluted fashion (Antin and Haas, 2001). We are 
not surprised to find out the dissemination of environmental information and reports on 
internet corporate websites have become increasingly popular ever since. The internet will 
provide both new channels for existing forms of corporate accountability and corporate 
governance. However, Pattern and Crampton (2004) contend this may be overly optimistic 
based on some evidence that website environmental disclosure seems to serve more as a 
legitimating device than as an effort at greater corporate accountability.  
Environmental disclosure is an important media which can pass green operation message 
to all kinds of stakeholders. Sometimes such information might be reacted on capital market 
spontaneously（Gupta and Goldar, 2006）. A firm may not be able to fully capture the whole 
results of its environmental management through financial reporting. Therefore, it might cause 
stakeholders cannot reasonably evaluate a firm’s environmental risks accordingly (Rubinstein, 
1989). Stakeholder groups quite often demonstrate their needs for firms to fulfill their social 
responsibility and their obligation. In a way, corporate environmental disclosure is a means for 
firms to exhibit their social responsibility.      
Previous studies demonstrate a correlation between stakeholders and environmental 
disclosure（Neu, Warsame and Pedwell, 1998；Hughes, Anderson and Golden, 2001； 
Elijido-Ten, 2004； Liu and Anbumozhi, 2009； Huang and Kung, 2010）. However, few 
researches have been done in Taiwan, especially in the areas of corporate website and 
stakeholders’ power. On top of these, past researches regarding the impact of corporate 
performance on environmental disclosure show different results. Some studies show positive 
relationship（Gamerschlag, Möller, and Verbeeten, 2010），; others show negative relationship 
instead（Alnajjar, 2000；Huang and Kung, 2010）. Even more, some argue that the reason why 
a firm is engaged to environmental disclosure is to cover up a firm’s misconduct （Moneva and 
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Cuellar, 2009）or to react to a potential treat imposed on a firm’s normal operations（Cho and 
Roberts, 2010）. 
The purpose of this study is to examine the content and presentation of corporate 
environmental disclosure in relation to firm’s stakeholder groups and financial performance. 
With 292 samples of Taiwanese listed companies in manufacturing industry, we investigate 
whether stakeholder powers influence website environmental disclosure. Our results 
suggest that major key stakeholders such as government, competitors, employees and foreign 
institutional investors positively affect the level of environmental information disclosure. 
Ffurthermore, it seems that poor performance of the corporations will focus on 
environmental information disclosure, in order to enhance the corporate image and 
reputation. In addition, firms with higher environmental sensitivity industry, higher market 
share ratio, more employees and higher foreign institutional investor holdings tend to reveal 
the opportunity of the environmental information in general.  
The remainder of the article is organized as follows: the following reviews the pertinent 
literature and frames the testable hypotheses; we then present our research design and sample 
selection process; further section discusses our empirical evidence; and the final section 
summarizes our conclusions, implications, and limitations. 
Literature review 
Stakeholder theory 
A stakeholder as defined by Freeman (1984) “is any group or individual who can affect 
or is affected by the achievement of the organization’s objectives” (p. 46). Stakeholder Theory 
explains a firm’s specific actions using a stakeholder-agency approach, and is concerned with how 
stakeholders, with their competing interests, are managed by organizations in terms of 
acknowledgment of stakeholder accountability (Freeman et al., 2007; Mitchell et al., 1997). The 
Justification is that stakeholders are those who have ‘‘a stake’’ in an organization and have 
something ‘‘at risk’’ (Collier, 2008). 
If stakeholders’ interests are satisfied, the chance of successfulness for a firm will be 
greatly enhanced (Freeman, 1984). Hillman and Keim（2001）argue that an effective 
stakeholders’ management will constitute intangible assets for firms and will facilitate mutual 
trust and commitments between firms and stakeholders, therefore it will lift firms’ competition 
advantages accordingly.   
With the surge of environmental protection consciousness, firms must undertake pressure 
from all kinds of stakeholders and have to satisfy stakeholders’ demand. Stakeholders are 
intrinsically concerned about the organization's performance and activities because of their 
societal expectations and the social contract (Matthews, 1993; Deegan and Rankin, 1996; 
Deegan et al., 2002). Such expectations are complemented by a desire to acquire pertinent 
information about the organization since it enables the stakeholders and relevant publics to 
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know in advance what the organization will expect of them and what they may expect of the 
organization.  Liu and Anbumozhi（2009）contend that government can lift the level of 
corporate environmental disclosure through environmental legislation requirements. Recently, 
some empirical evidence has found stakeholders are important factors for corporate 
environmental disclosure (Neu et al., 1998；Hughes et al., 2001；Elijido-Ten, 2004；Liu and 
Anbumozhi, 2009; Huang and Kung, 2010）. Corporate stakeholders are composed of external 
and internal stakeholders.  
External stakeholders and website environmental disclosure 
Government power is oriented from legislation which can impose firms to disclose 
environmental information and other activities. Prior study point out that if a firm belongs to 
environment sensitive industry, it might do more extensive disclosure (Neu et al., 1998; Liu 
and Anbumozhi, 2009).  
Creditors’ power is determined by the extent of corporate financing demand (Roberts, 
1992). Empirical evidence shows that corporate liability ratio has positive association with 
social disclosure (Roberts, 1992) and that creditors might evaluate corporate risk by means of 
environmental performance (Hughes, 2000). 
Customers’ power comes from themselves since they provide revenues for firms. 
Damiano-Teixeira and Pompermayer (2007) demonstrate when customers make consumption; 
they would consider suppliers’ social behavior. Huang and Kung (2010) also contend that there 
is a positive relation between customer and environmental disclosure. 
It is obviously that suppliers play as an important role in terms of entire supply chain. 
Suppliers will demand to see more transparent environmental information to keep themselves 
updated on the latest corporate environmental strategies. Huang and Kung (2010) argue that 
the higher inventory turnover, the more suppliers’ influence.  Gray, Javad, Power and Sinclair
（2001）also conclude that inventory turnover (a proxy of suppliers) is significantly related to 
the level of environmental disclosure.  
Due to a higher elimination rate, firms need to take on more active measures to retain 
their place in the industry. Gale (1972) argues that firms with a higher market share may wield 
greater influence in controlling the market. This argument also suggests that firms will receive 
more attention from the outside world than their competitor counterparts. For the purpose of 
maintaining the upper hand, firms need to pursue proactive strategies, including policies to 
reveal more environmental information. 
It is always wise for firms to be in a leading position in a marketplace. However, firms 
need to take more proactive strategy and conduct than other competitors. As a whole, 
implementation corporate social responsibility is a key; environmental disclosure is part of 
such implementation. Gale (1972) points out that the higher firm market share, the more 
5 
 
influence in the marketplace. Huang and Kung (2010) use market share as a proxy for 
competitors’ expectation.  
Auditing firm’s reputation and scale determine majority of part of clients’ financial 
statements’ quality. Sometimes, it even extends to the quality of other information disclosure. 
Ahmed and Courtis（1999）claim that if firms are audited by a well-know auditing firm, like 
Big 4, analysts would be persuaded such firms having higher disclosure quality.    
Professional analysts provide important information, which might have some impact 
on firms’ stock price, to investors. Lang and Lundholm (1996) state that the higher 
transparent information is, the more analysts would recommend. Richardson and Welker 
(2001) contend the number of analysts’ prediction is positively associated with social 
disclosure. The aforementioned literature and inferences regarding external stakeholder 
groups lead to the following hypothesis. 
H1: External stakeholders are significantly associated with website environmental 
disclosure. 
H1a: Government power is positively associated with website environmental disclosure. 
H1b: Creditors’ power is positively associated with website environmental disclosure. 
H1c: Clients’ power is positively associated with website environmental disclosure. 
H1d: Suppliers’ power is positively associated with website environmental disclosure. 
H1e: Competitors’ power is positively associated with website environmental disclosure. 
H1f: Analysts’ power is positively associated with website environmental disclosure. 
Internal stakeholders and website environmental disclosure 
When firms with more concentrated ownership, the less incentive for firms to respond 
potential investor’s needs for environmental disclosure (Cormier, Magnan and Van 
Velthoven ,2005). On the other hand, when firms with more diffused ownership, shareholders 
might demand firms to disclose more relevant information and take a step further to monitor 
the transparency of information provided (Clarkson, Li, and Richardson, 2004). Cormier et al.’s 
(2005) finding demonstrates that the concentrated ownership structure is negatively related to 
environmental disclosure. Therefore, shareholders with more diffused ownership could have a 
strong impact on firms’ environmental disclosure. 
Ruland, Tung, and George (1990) argue that when managers with less holding shares might 
voluntarily disclose earnings forecasting in order to reduce agency problem. We can infer that 
when managers with more holding shares, they might lack of incentive to increase the 
information transparency (including environmental information). 
Managing supervisors’ main function is to supervise the operation of board of directors 
and firm’s accounting issues. Shyy and Vijayravan (1996) claim that the stock price to book 
value of firms with board of directors and supervisors is higher than that of firms only with 
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board of directors. It appears that setting up managing supervisors for firms is need.  
When firms have produced environmental pollution, their employees usually very 
concern about their work environment and safety. Gray et al.（2001）and Gamerschlag et al.
（2010）state that the number of employees has positive relation with the level of 
environmental disclosure.  
Foreign institution shareholders usually possess professional expertise and knowledge. 
El-Gazzar (1998) contends that when foreign institution with higher holding ratio, they tend to 
demand firms to disclose more environmental information in order to raise information 
transparency. Similarly, domestic institution will do the same thing. Based on aforementioned 
literatures, we lead to the following hypotheses.  
H2:  Internal stakeholders are significantly associated with website environmental 
disclosure. 
H2a: Shareholders’ poser is positively associated with website environmental disclosure. 
H2b: Managers’ poser power is positively associated with website environmental 
disclosure. 
H2c: Managing supervisors’ power is positively associated with website environmental 
disclosure. 
H2d: Employees’ power is positively associated with website environmental disclosure. 
H2e: Foreign institutions’ power is positively associated with website environmental 
disclosure. 
H2f: Domestic institutions’ power is positively associated with website environmental 
disclosure. 
Financial performance and environmental disclosure 
Prior researches indicate that those firms with better performance are capable to disclose 
related environmental information about their corporate strategies, corporate operations and 
implementation performance to whoever needs such information to get father understanding 
about those firms. Besides, these firms also have enough resources to devote themselves to 
environmental disclosure. According to Gamerschlag et al.’s（2010）finding, the return rate of 
stockholders’ equities is significantly associated with the level of environmental disclosure. 
However, the environmental disclosure might also be overly exaggerated to disclose positive 
contribution on top of concealing negative behavior instead (Moneva and Cuellar, 2009). 
Shane and Spicer (1983) document a negative market reaction two days preceding the 
release of environmental reports. Richardson and Welker (2001) observe that there is 
positive relation between social disclosure (which subsumes environmental disclosure) and 
cost of capital, with more profitable firms being penalized more for their environmental 
disclosures. Cho and Roberts (2010) contend that firms might pretend everything is going 
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well when they are exposed to the public’s watch over. Alnajjar（2000）argues that firm’s 
profitability is negatively associated with the level of social responsibility disclosure. Huang 
and Kung (2010) obtain similar results as well.  
These researchers point out significantly negative relation between the level of 
environmental disclosure and the cost of capital. These findings may imply that increased 
environmental disclosure is associated with lower share prices. Obviously, this evidence is 
not consistent with the notion that discretionary disclosure reduces asymmetrical 
information or that increased social disclosure might trigger a favorable investor 
preference.  Since above prior researches show inconsistent results, we do not predict 
positive or negative association between financial performance and environmental 
disclosure. We can infer the following hypotheses:  
H3: Financial performance is significantly associated with website environmental 
disclosure. 
H3a: The return rate of total assets is significantly associated with website environmental 
disclosure. 
H3b: The return rate of Sales is significantly associated with website environmental 
disclosure. 
H3c: The return rate of Market to book value is significantly associated with website 
environmental disclosure. 
H3d: The Tobin’s Q is significantly associated with website environmental disclosure. 
Methodology 
Sample selection and data collection 
The sample we use is Top 500 manufacturers chose by Common Wealth Magazine 
No. 446 in May 2010. After excluding those firms that did not have sufficient data, our 
final sample consists of 292 firms. Stakeholders’ information and firms’ financial 
performance of 2009 are collected from individual firm and the Taiwan Economic Journal 
(TEJ) database. In addition, environmental disclosure is taken from firm’s official website using 
content analysis from September 2010 to December 2010.  
Measurement 
Dependent variable-website environmental disclosure 
Environmental disclosure is an important media to a firm. It can pass “green” operation 
message to all kind of stakeholders. Patten (2002) defines environmental disclosure as 
collective form of the past, present, and future environmental activities and performance 
information. The level of environmental disclosure (LEID) is measured by disclosure scoring 
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technique similar to that of Cho and Roberts (2010). According to the checklist on the 
measurement scale items, one point is assigned to each area of environmental disclosure 
included in the firm’s website. If a firm does not disclose for a given item, then zero point is 
assigned. At the end, we employ content analysis to identify the extent of environmental 
disclosure. 
Independent variable-stakeholders and corporate performance 
Similarly to Cowen et al. (1987) and Patten (1991), we consider the cement, plastics, textiles, 
chemical, paper and pulp, iron and steel, and rubber industries to be more environmentally  
sensitive in Taiwan, other industries is regarded as less environmentally sensitive. Table 1 
summarizes the definition and measurement of all the proxy variables for independent 
variables used in this study. 
Table 1 Measurement for independent variables 
Stakeholders Proxy variables References 
External:   
Government (SI) Environmental sensitivity of the industry (dummy 
variable 1=environmentally sensitive, 0=other).  
Holland and Foo, 
2003 
Creditor (DR) Liability ratio= Liabilities / Total assets Liu and Anbumozhi
（2009） 
Customer (AR) Customer intensity=advertizing expenses / Sales Park (1999) 
Supplier (ITR) Inventory turnover=inventory turnover / industry average 
turnover 
Huang and Kung
（2010） 
Competitor (MSR) Market share=Sales / industry average sales Huang and Kung
（2010） 
Auditing firm 
(Big4) 
Type of auditing firm (dummy variable 1=Big 4, 0 = 
other). 
Huang and Kung
（2010） 
Analyst (Analyst) The frequency of forecasting by analyst (dummy 
variable1=above median of the frequency of forecasting; 
0=other). 
 
Internal:   
Stockholder 
(StockHR) 
Top 10 substantial stockholders holding ratio= Top 10 
substantial shareholders’ shares / firm’s outstanding shares  
Liu and Anbumozhi
（2009） 
Manager (MHR) Manager’s holding ratio = manager’s shares/firm’s 
outstanding shares 
 
Managing 
Supervisor 
(SuperHR)  
Managing supervisor’s holding ratio = Managing 
supervisor’s shares/firm’s outstanding shares 
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Employee (NE) The number of employees Gray et al.（2001）, 
Gamerschlag et al.
（2010） 
Foreign institution 
(FCH)  
Foreign institution holding ratio =foreign institution shares / 
firm’s outstanding shares. 
 
Domestic 
institution (DCH) 
Domestic institution holding ratio = local institution 
ownership / firm’s outstanding shares 
 
Corporate 
performance: 
  
Accounting based 
performance 
Return on Assets (ROA)= Net income after tax +interest 
expense (1-tax rate)/average assets 
Return on Sales (ROS)＝Net income after tax/net sales 
 
Market based 
performance 
Tobin’ s Q 
Market to net worth= price per share /book value per share 
 
Control Variable:   
Firm size (Size) Firm’s total assets ( dummy variable1= above median of 
firm’s total assets, 0=other) 
Patten ( 2002) 
Empirical model 
We test the relationship between stakeholder expectations and environmental disclosure by 
estimating the following regression: 
LEIDt＝α0＋α1SIt-1＋α2DR t-1＋α3AR t-1＋α4ITR t-1＋α5MSR t-1＋α6Big4 t-1＋α7Analyst t-1 
＋α8StockHR t-1＋α9MHRt-1＋α10SuperHRt-1＋α11NEt-1＋α12FCHt-1＋α13DCHt-1 
＋α14Corporate Performance t-1＋α15 Sizet-1＋ε   ……………………..…………(Eq.1) 
Results 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the study’s dependent variables.  
 
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics (N=292） 
  Min. Max. Median Mean S. D. 
SI 0 1 1 .829 .377 
DR(%） 7.740% 81.820% 35.610% 35.892% .148 
AR (%） 0.000% 6.435% 0.000% 0.273% .009 
ITR (%）  19.773% 581.951% 86.160% 99.227% .610 
MSR (%）  0.003% 65.531% 0.277% 3.028% .076 
10 
 
Big4 0 1 1 .904 .295 
Analyst 0 1 1 .640 .481 
StockHR (%） 7.370% 95.540% 33.410% 36.931% .166 
MHR (%） 0.000% 13.030% 0.280% 0.820% .017 
SuperHR (%） 0.000% 65.880% 1.200% 2.696% .052 
NE  23 29377 804 1668 2891.423 
FCH (%） 0.000% 72.250% 6.215% 11.016% .134 
DCHR (%） 0.210% 88.660% 18.980% 24.739% .187 
Size 0 1 1 .521 .500 
ROA (%） -26.520% 39.450% 5.830% 5.481% .082 
ROS (%） -231.464% 376.038% 6.147% 6.773% .339 
MBV  .560 12.540 173.000% 2.077 1.486 
TOBIN Q 75.228 7889.395 1039.796 1250.240 921.392 
 
Regression Analysis 
The results of our regression model examining the relations among stakeholders, firm 
performance, and website environmental disclosure, as specified in Eq. 1, appear in Table 3. 
External Stakeholders’ expectations Vs. website environmental disclosure 
The coefficients for the explanatory variables in Eq. 1 suggest that some external 
stakeholders have significant impacts on firm environmental disclosure.    
As for external stakeholders, the coefficients for the explanatory variables suggest that 
environmentally sensitive industry (SI) has a significant positive relationship with environmental 
disclosure (p=0.009). Therefore H1a is supported. This is consistent with Neu et al.（1998）and Liu 
and Anbumozhi (2009). It might indicate that more environmental disclosure may be 
expected from the companies having higher environmental sensitivities. They tend to show 
environmental legitimacy to the government in order to prevent fines or penalties. Patten 
(1991) concludes that environmentally sensitive industries tend to voluntarily disclose 
more environmental information for the sake of earning positive social image. Further we 
find that competitors’ power (MSR) is significantly positively associated with website 
environmental disclosure as predicted (p<0.1). Hence H1e is supported. This result is 
consistent with that of Huang and Kung (2010). It seems that competitor’s behaviors may 
play an important role to stimulate more voluntarily environmental disclosure. As to the 
rest of external stakeholders: such as creditors (DR), customers (AR), suppliers (ITR), 
auditing firms (Big4), and analysts, no significant associations are found.  
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Table 3 Regression results (N=292) 
Independent variable Predicted sign Std. coefficient p value 
  constant     0.067
External  SI + 0.141 0.009 *** 
stakeholders DR + 0.078 0.168  
 AR + 0.036 0.488  
 ITR + -0.045 0.392  
 MSR + 0.095 0.076 * 
 Big4 + -0.015 0.772  
  Analyst + -0.019 0.751   
Internal  StockHR - -0.167 0.040 ** 
stakeholders’ MHR - -0.005 0.923  
 SuperHR ＋ 0.093 0.089 * 
 NE + 0.303 0.000 *** 
 FCHR + 0.190 0.005 *** 
  DCHR + 0.164 0.041 ** 
Financial 
performance 
Accounting based financial performance：         
 ROA +/- 0.028 0.701  
 ROS +/- -0.126 0.039 ** 
 Market based financial performance：     
 MBV +/- -0.006 0.937  
  TOBIN Q +/- 0.022 0.764   
Control var. Firm Size   0.184 0.002 *** 
N=292             
Durbin-Watson test   2.171   
R2   0.344   
Adjusted R2   0.300   
F statistic     7.936***   
a. ***p＜0.01；**p＜0.05；*＜0.10； 
Internal stakeholders’ expectations Vs. website environmental disclosure 
We find some evidence that quite a few internal stakeholders are associated with website 
environmental disclosure. Except for managers (MHR), our results show that Top 10 
stockholders are negatively associated with environmental disclosure (p<0.05). H2a is 
supported. This result is consistent with those of Elijido-Ten (2007) and Liu and Anbumozhi 
(2009). A positive relationship is evident between managing supervisors (Super HR) and 
environmental disclosure, implying that these supervisors represent a strong group having a 
power to determine the firm’s business strategy. H2c is supported accordingly (0.093, p=0.089). 
Similarly, employees (NE) also show positive significant association with environmental 
disclosure (p＜0.01).  H2d is supported. This is consistent with those of Gray et al. (2001) and 
Gamerschlag et al. (2010). This may indicate that employees may play their influence on the 
transparency of environmental information in terms of concerning their own health and safety 
of their work environment. In addition, the coefficients for both foreign institutions (FCHR, 
0.190; p=0.005) and domestic institutions (DCHR, 0.164, p=0.041) are as expected. Hence, 
H2e and H2f are strongly supported. These findings suggest that institutional shareholders, 
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possessing more professional know ledges and being well-motivated by self-protection, may 
force a firm to do more environmental disclosure than ordinary shareholders do. Interestingly, 
the relationship between managers and website environment disclosure is not significant. This 
may be attributed to managers held major legal responsibility in a firm and directly get paid 
from their employers, so they might be able in a good position to demand their own firms. 
Financial performance Vs. website environmental disclosure 
Prior research on the environmental disclosure and financial performance relation 
has used both market-based and accounting-based measures of financial performance. For 
example, Shane and Spicer (1983) document a negative market reaction two days 
preceding the release of environmental reports. Richardson and Welker (2001) observe that 
there is positive relation between social disclosure (which subsumes environmental 
disclosure) and cost of capital, with more profitable firms being penalized more for their 
environmental disclosures. These researchers present a significantly negative relation 
between the level of environmental disclosure and the cost of capital. These findings may 
imply that increased environmental disclosure is associated with lower share prices.  
Two measurements of financial performance, accounting base (ROA, ROS) and market 
base (MBV, TOBIN Q), are used in our study. The most striking observation to emerge from 
the result is that there is only one significant negative correlation between accounting based 
financial performance-Return on Sales (ROS) and environmental disclosure. Hence, only H3b 
is supported. This result is consistent with other researchers’ findings (Alnajjar, 2000; Huang 
and Kung, 2010). This finding suggests that when the less profitable a firm is, the more 
willingness to disclose website environmental information (Cho and Roberts, 2010; 
Moneva and Cuellar, 2009). This evidence is not consistent with the notion that 
discretionary disclosure reduces asymmetrical information or that more environmental 
disclosure triggers favorable investor preference effect.  
As to the rest of performance indices (ROA, MBV, and TOBIN Q), no evidence 
significantly support our Hypothesis of H3a, H3c, and H3d . Although this finding may 
sound unusual, it is quite consistent with Freedman and Jaggi’s (1992) results. They test 
the association of their measurements of environmental disclosure against several 
accounting ratios used to measure financial performance. They find no significant 
association either. One possible reason driving this insignificant result could be the fact 
that there are too many exogenous factors other than website environmental disclosure 
might affect financial performance. However, the adjusted R-square is 30% suggesting that 
stakeholders’ expectation and firm performance are most likely a key determinant of a firm’s 
website environmental disclosure. 
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Conclusions 
Our study developed a stakeholder framework and analyzed the environmental 
disclosure behaviors of Taiwan listed manufacturing firms. The results also provide important 
insights into the determinants for the level of environmental disclosure in Taiwan.With 292 
samples of Taiwanese listed firms in manufacturing industry, we investigate whether 
stakeholder powers influence the level of environment disclosure on corporate website. We 
also investigate the relationship between corporate performance and the level of environment 
disclosure as well. Our empirical results suggest that major key stakeholders such as 
government, competitors, employees and foreign institutional investors will positively affect 
the level of environmental information disclosure. Furthermore, poor performance of the 
corporations will focus on environmental information disclosure, in order to enhance the 
corporate image and reputation. In addition, firms with higher environmental sensitivity 
industry, higher market share ratio, more employees and higher foreign institutional investor 
holdings tend to reveal the opportunity of the environmental information in general. 
The most striking observation to emerge from the result is that there is only one 
significant negative correlation between accounting based financial performance-Return on 
Sales (ROS) and environmental disclosure. This finding suggest that when the less profitable 
a firm is, the more willingness to disclose website environmental information (Cho and 
Roberts, 2010; Moneva and Cuellar, 2009). This evidence is not consistent with the notion 
that discretionary disclosure reduces asymmetrical information or that more environmental 
disclosure triggers favorable investor preference effect. One possible reason driving this 
insignificant result could be the fact that there are too many exogenous factors other than 
website environmental disclosure might affect financial performance. 
This study is subject to several limitations. Just like all cross-sectional studies, 
limitations to interpreting our results apply regarding whether the time period examined is 
representative and the observed relations among the variables of interest are relatively stable 
over time. In the meantime, our method of scoring the level of environmental disclosure retains 
a subjective element. Most important is that we gather our environmental information directly 
from individual firm’s website. Some information reported is fragmented. Some local firms 
may have insufficient environmental awareness, coupled with low demands for detail 
information about stakeholders in general. This might cause low level of voluntary 
environmental disclosure as a result. Future research is suggested to do some parallel 
comparison between the environmental disclosure gather from corporate websites and annual 
reports along with stakeholders’ expectations.  
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